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BRIEFING PAPER

UN MOBILIZES FOR PEACE

Mozambique
Out of the ruins of war

By Ernest Harsch with Roy Laishley

With the end of gunfire after years of brutal war and the return of rains after the worst drought in living memory, a cautious mood of optimism has begun to spread through Mozambique. A large-scale relief effort, led by the UN, its agencies and the governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has already averted the mass starvation that was feared as a result of the severe drought. Preliminary estimates suggest less than a third of the people in Mozambique now receiving emergency food relief will again need aid in the coming 12 months. The government itself has been implementing a political reform process which is transforming the country from a one-party state to a multi-party system; and an equally far-reaching and difficult economic restructuring which began turning a state-directed socialist economy into a more market-oriented one.

But the country's relative peace is still very fragile and quick United Nations action on a wide array of fronts is essential to turn Mozambicans' hopes and efforts for peace into reality. The centrepiece of these actions is a massive peace-keeping and humanitarian operation which combines monitoring a cease-fire and demobilization of more than 100,000 soldiers, the repatriation of some 1.5 million refugees and up to 4 million displaced people, the delivery of food and other emergency aid, the preparation of future elections and orchestrating aid for recovery and rehabilitation.

In the general peace agreement signed between the government of Mozambique and the insurgent Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) in Rome on 4 October 1992, the UN was given the central role in implementing the various accords. These cover four major areas —

Nanda Lissane

The first ONUMOZ peace-keeping contingent of Italian troops arrives in Beira in March.

Salim Lone and Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill contributed to this Briefing Paper.

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Countries contributing troops to ONUMOZ

Argentina	Canada
Bangladesh	Guinea-Bissau
Brazil	Hungary
Cape Verde	India
Egypt	Zambia
Italy	Spain
Malaysia	Portugal
Sweden	Czech Republic
Uruguay	Russian
Botswana	Federation

political, military, humanitarian and electoral (see box below).

On 16 December, the UN Security Council formally established the multi-faceted UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) combining both peace-keeping and humanitarian mandates. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had earlier appointed Mr. Aldo Ajello his Special Representative for Mozambique.

Since October, the UN has been mobilizing the financial, military, administrative and logistical resources needed for one of its largest and most complex operations anywhere, while trying to maintain the political momentum for peace generated by the signing of the Rome agreement. The difficulties it has faced have been manifold: overcoming the legacy of mistrust and devastation from years of war; tackling the present ad hoc mechanism for setting up peace-keeping operations, which has delayed the deployment of international forces; and allaying the understandable concern within Mozambique over the impact of UN forces in the country.

Many of these difficulties remain; the UN has approved financing for the operation only until June, despite general agreement that it will have to remain substantially in place for a lengthy period after that. Elections, originally scheduled for October, are now not expected until next year. Many of the commissions overseeing implementation of the accords have not been established. In part this is because of organizational and political problems facing Renamo, but also because it declined to attend the commissions during March following concerns over accomodation in Maputo and other issues. This has prevented agreement on the location of the 49 assembly areas which are key to starting the demobilization process. On top of this, Renamo has demanded that 65 percent of UN peace-keeping forces be deployed before demobilization begins. This level was expected to be reached by the end of April. Concerned over delays, the Security Council on 14 April called on the government and Renamo to take "urgent and determined steps" to begin demobilization, as well as training of a new unified defence force.

That the peace agreement has generally held, despite the delays and inevitable outbreaks of violence and tension, is testament to the deep desire in the country to end the conflict and build for the future. Meanwhile, destabilization from South Africa has come to an end. The peace process remains on track, with both President Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama declaring it "irreversible." But the delicate trust now being built between parties which have fought one of the most bitter wars in recent years remains fragile. The frustration over delays in beginning the demobilization in particular is leading to increased tension, in a climate of still deep suspicion. Thousands of armed soldiers and irregular forces, often lacking discipline and without pay and sometimes food, remain an explosive element, raising fears that the terror spreading through much of Angola could also happen in Mozambique. This was why the Secretary-General argued for a much larger force in Mozambique and for an active UN role in demobilization, two elements lacking in Angola, where demobilization was far from complete when elections took place. "In the light of recent experience in Angola," it is "of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented," Mr. Boutros-Ghali argued in a 3 December report on ONUMOZ.

Full implementation of the peace-keeping operation "cannot be delayed any longer," Mr. Boutros-Ghali warned in a 2 April report to the Security Council, which in turn unanimously voiced its serious concern over the delays, in a 14 April resolution. Implementation is now accelerating. The peace-keeping battalions, which will total some 7,500 troops,

The task facing ONUMOZ

ONUMOZ is now undertaking the multiple tasks envisaged in the October peace accords. These provide four major areas of responsibility:

Political: To facilitate and supervise implementation of the peace accords, in particular through chairing of the overseeing Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC).

Military: To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the destruction of armaments, the demobilization of military forces, including the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups (essentially through the cantonment of forces in some 49 assembly areas throughout the country) and to establish security for vital infrastructures and for the five transport corridors —Nampula, Tete, Beira, Limpopo and the National Highway. (Establishment of a new unified defence force is being undertaken separately but in parallel with ONUMOZ.)

Electoral: To assist and monitor the entire electoral process. This will include fielding a large team of international observers for the elections — originally scheduled for October 1993, but now not expected until 1994 — as well as providing technical help and monitoring the arrangements for voter registration, a new electoral law, etc.

(Parallel international support is being given for the establishment and organization of political parties, including for Renamo.)

Humanitarian: To coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, including resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, food aid and other assistance for emergency relief and to demobilized forces and for the rehabilitation process.

READEX
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UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

Headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique, Mr. Aldo Ajello, charged with implementation of the General Peace Agreement signed on 4 October 1992.

ONUMOZ Military Command

Headed by Major General Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva of Brazil

7,500 armed troops to secure transport corridors and supervise demobilization

354 unarmed personnel to monitor the cease-fire

(3 regional offices)

Electoral Division

Director: to be appointed

148 international electoral offices (plus support staff) to verify impartiality and freedom of the electoral process, including voter registration

(3 regional offices and 10 provincial offices)

Some 1,200 international observers required for actual polling.

Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC)

Coordinator: Bernt Bernander, who also chairs the separate Humanitarian Assistance Committee

Coordinates humanitarian assistance programmes, with representatives from UN agencies and NGOs attached.

(3 regional offices and 10 provincial offices)

began arriving in force in March and by May will be fully deployed. Through the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) in Maputo and other agencies, demobilized troops can be registered, fed and sheltered, and returned to their home areas. The government has drafted an electoral law which will be debated and hopefully agreed at a multi-party conference. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), in a new role, has been providing assistance for the electoral process. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is to call a follow-up donors' meeting shortly to assess the financing gap for relief and rehabilitation through to 1994. And the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expects to begin repatriating voluntary refugees in June, following an appeal to donors for further aid. Meanwhile, UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), and other agencies continue to provide emergency relief to millions of Mozambicans.

The scale of Mozambique's tragedy is difficult to grasp. Out of a total population of some 16 million people, an estimated 4-5 million — more than a quarter — were driven from their homes by the decade and a half of fighting, and more recently by drought. Some 200,000 children have been orphaned and another quarter million separated from their families or otherwise severely traumatized. Nutritional levels remain among the lowest anywhere, especially among children, and disease is rife and spreading.

Mozambique today is the poorest country in the world, with a gross national product of just $70 per person. Two-thirds of all Mozambicans are estimated to be living in extreme poverty. This largely reflects the destruction wrought through civil war and persistent external destabilization.

The challenge facing the UN operation is enormous, not only in the country, but also in continuing to mobilize the international resources for the maintenance of the peace-keeping, electoral and humanitarian operations. Security in the country remains precarious. The UN estimates that there are up to 2 million mines spread throughout the country, making many roads extremely dangerous to travel. The country remains flooded with arms. Gangs of bandits and irregular troops, desperate from hunger, have attacked food convoys and ordinary citizens. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have started to return from neighbouring countries, but UNHCR reports that others continue to flee from localized violence.

The ability of ONUMOZ to tackle these problems has been constrained by the continuing lack of trust between the major parties, which it is hoped can shortly be further eased by a meeting between the two leaders. The UN forces have also had their effectiveness restricted by the lack of an agreement with the government permitting their movement without prior official approval. The Security Council in April stressed the importance of the "early" signing of a 'status of forces' agreement which would resolve this problem.

Nafta Ussene

"The UN can only facilitate the peace process, it cannot impose it." — *Mr. Aldo Ajello*

In such a delicate and complex political and military situation the slow build-up of ONUMOZ forces has complicated the peace process. In part, this is a result of the lack of an established budgetary and operational system for such peace-keeping operations. There have also been administrative delays in the UN. At UN budgetary discussions in February, Mozambique's UN ambassador, Mr. Pedro Comissario Afonso, noted that the cease-fire in Mozambique had already held for nearly half a year without a significant UN presence in the field. But he urged the prompt and full deployment of ONUMOZ, arguing that the spirit of good will and cooperation displayed by all the parties in Mozambique should

New challenges for UN agencies

UN Development Programme (UNDP): As well as helping to coordinate relief and rehabilitation efforts, it is coordinating technical assistance for the entire electoral process in Mozambique. This has included help in the drafting of the electoral law, as well as with the electoral process and budget.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Faces its largest operation ever in Africa in helping the voluntary repatriation of some 1.5 million refugees in six neighbouring countries. It is already providing assistance to 1.3 million registered refugees.

World Food Programme (WFP): Will ensure the delivery of food aid for some 1.2 million displaced and 1.1 million returnees, as well as continuing supplies to refugees in camps in six countries. In addition, it has made arrangements for feeding the 100,000 soldiers expected to be demobilized. With the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), it is assessing Mozambique's food production and future aid requirements.

UN Children's Fund (UNICEF): Is also assisting in the delivery of (non-food) aid to demobilizing soldiers. This is in addition to the task it faces in providing medical and nutritional aid to displaced and returnee mothers and children and in expanding its on-going operations among the rest of Mozambique's population.

World Health Organization (WHO) and UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are also helping in the health and educational/training needs respectively of demobilized soldiers and their families and of returnees.



Naita Ussene

Distributing food aid in Inhambane Province. UN agencies will ensure food supplies to demobilized soldiers and their families, as well as to refugees and other traditional recipients.

not be undermined "at this critical hour" by a lack of resolute action by the international community. In his April report, the Secretary-General stressed that the delays in deployment show that the UN "clearly needs more rapid and effective means as well as more flexible practices."

However, it is the government and Renamo which bear the responsibility for the delays in implementation of the peace agreement and they must "quickly shift gears" in carrying out the Rome accords, Mr. Kofi Annan, head of the UN's peace-keeping operations, told *Africa Recovery* in mid-April. The Secretary-General has stressed that all the strands of the UN operation in Mozambique — political, military, humanitarian, electoral — are interdependent. "Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies," he said in the December report, "the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, requires prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections."

The continued support of the international community, backing the implementation efforts of the UN and its specialized agencies, and of the Mozambican authorities, political groupings and non-governmental organizations, remains crucial to ONUMOZ's success. Such support has been most dramatically expressed by the 19 governments which are sending military and other personnel to Mozambique (two further countries may also send troops). Others are members of the commissions overseeing implementation of the peace accords. Portugal, the UK and Zimbabwe are helping in the establishment of a new unified defence force; Sweden and the Netherlands have pledged help for de-mining. The European Community and the US have pledged support to the electoral process. International support is also being mobilized for Mozambique's immediate economic rehabilitation through the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs. At a 15-16 December conference in Rome, convened by the Italian government, donors pledged $398 mn, virtually all the estimated needs. In parallel with this effort the international community is supporting the country's long-term economic recovery. At a World Bank-sponsored conference in Paris on 9-10 December, donors pledged $760 mn to support this reform effort and other recovery needs.

I. SAFEGUARDING THE PEACE PROCESS

The 4 October 1992 general peace accords, signed in Rome between the Mozambican government and Renamo, aimed to bring an end to one of the longest and most devastating wars the African continent has known. After only a few years of relative peace following its independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique was soon plunged into a decade and a half of a devastating insurgency launched by Renamo and of an extensive external destabilization campaign. This two-edged conflict cost the economy more than $15 bn and claimed the lives of an estimated 1 million Mozambicans, either directly from the fighting itself or from the famine and disease that came in its wake. Virtually every Mozambican family has at least one member or acquaintance who was killed, or mutilated or disappeared (see box, page 13).

After several years of tough negotiations, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama vowed to put the past behind them. They pledged, in the words of the peace agreement signed in Rome, "to do everything within their power for the achievement of genuine national reconciliation." The initial response of their followers was encouraging. Even with the delay in the arrival of the first UN peace-keeping contingents, the cease-fire has generally held, despite a brief flurry of fighting in the first few weeks and sporadic violations since then.

With roads that were previously "no go" zones opening up, many people have begun to return to their homes, including former combatants from both sides. Stories proliferate of Renamo soldiers venturing into government-controlled areas to seek acceptance from villagers they had once attacked, of fraternization and sports matches between Renamo and government forces and of numerous other efforts at reconciliation.

After so many years of fighting, however, reconciliation cannot come easily. Deep mistrust exists on all sides and it was for this reason that both the Mozambican government and Renamo asked the UN, as an impartial intermediary, to play the central role in helping them carry the peace agreements into effect.

UN takes the lead

In a letter to Mr. Boutros-Ghali the day the peace accords were signed, President Chissano asked the UN to take overall responsibility for supervising and ensuring their implementation and to provide assistance and monitoring for the general elections.

"The task which the Government and Renamo have agreed to ask the United Nations to assume is a large and difficult one," the UN Secretary-General noted in his December report to the Security Council. The problems, he said, derived from the sheer size of the country; the devastation of communications, other infrastructure and the economy generally; the Mozambican government's limited capacity to deal with the new challenges; and the very complexity of the peace process itself.

While the UN would take the lead, Mr. Boutros-Ghali stated that the magnitude of the undertaking required the involvement of the entire international community. The breadth of this involvement is reflected, in part, in the composition of the main commissions set up to oversee implementation of the peace accords (see box, page 6).

Bruno Moscon/AP Wide World Photos

Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano (left) and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama shake hands following the signing of the 4 October peace accords in Rome. In the centre, Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo.

The work of these commissions, however, has been seriously delayed, in large part by the continuing mistrust and differences between the government and Renamo. Although Renamo named Mr. Raul Domingos as its chief negotiator and other representatives to the main commissions, it was slow in putting forward names for others specified in the peace agreement, practicing a "policy of the empty chair," in the words of Mr. Ajello. Renamo has now promised its 45 representatives will be in Maputo by the end of April.

Renamo has also not permitted government personnel to enter the areas it controls. The main Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), chaired by the UN, has held several meetings, but even it failed to meet during most of March, stalling the demobilization drive, as well as preventing the resolution of cease-fire disputes. Of the other seven commissions directly involved in implementing the political, military and electoral aspects of the peace accords, only the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) has met with any regularity, and five of them, as of the beginning of April, had yet to be constituted.

To permit the various aspects of the peace accords to be implemented effectively, Mr. Ajello said in a

mid-March interview with *Africa Recovery*, it will be necessary to further build up some measure of trust among the former adversaries, and he has had frequent meetings with both sides in an effort to help iron out the disputes and find areas of common ground.

One of the most crucial elements for establishing an atmosphere of security and confidence is the deployment of the UN peace-keeping forces in the country. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva of Brazil, they will comprise 354 unarmed personnel to monitor the cease-fire, and approximately 7,500 armed troops to secure the main transport corridors and other parts of the country and supervise the demobilization of government troops and Renamo fighters.

However, there were serious delays in starting the deployment, which in turn threw off other aspects of the operation. Both sides, but especially Renamo, were extremely slow in designating assembly areas for their troops, in allowing the UN to conduct reconnaissance in these areas, and to start verification procedures. As of early April, no soldier had been assembled and disarmed. According to the original timetable specified in the Rome accords, UN military observers should have been in place in Mozambique within about a month of the promulgation of the cease-fire on 15 October.

Unrealistic timetable

This timetable was "completely unrealistic" to begin with, according to Mr. Ajello. On the one hand, as regards infantry units, it was not easy for the Secretary-General to quickly find countries willing to commit troops for ONUMOZ, especially at a time when many had pledged forces to Somalia and other UN operations. On the other hand, it took some time for the UN to approve the funds necessary for ONUMOZ. Aside from an initial start-up allocation of $9.5 mn, it was not until 16 March that the General Assembly formally approved the ONUMOZ budget. Even then, at the recommendation of the budgetary committee, it only approved a portion of the amount requested by the Secretary-General: $140 mn through the end of June, rather than the full $264 mn originally estimated to be necessary through 15 October, the period of ONUMOZ's initial mandate.

By mid-March, Bangladesh, Botswana, Italy, Uruguay and Zambia had pledged to provide one infantry battalion each for ONUMOZ, while Portugal offered to send a communications battalion, India three logistics companies and Argentina one medical unit. Negotiations have been held with other countries as well. In addition, more than 20 countries had offered to provide cease-fire monitors, of whom nearly half were in Mozambique by mid-March.

The first military contingent, an Italian battalion of some 1,060 personnel, became fully operational on 1 April. Deployed in the Beira Corridor, its presence allows the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops who have been guarding the vital railway link, with its oil pipeline, against Renamo insurgents for several years. The bulk of the remaining ONUMOZ contingents were due to be fully deployed in April and May. They will take up positions along the Limpopo (Zambian

A difficult negotiating process

It took several years of hard, on-and-off negotiations to reach a general peace agreement in Mozambique.

From the early 1980s, the Mozambican government made a number of approaches to the South African authorities, seeking to negotiate an end to their support for Renamo, and signed the Nkomati Accords in 1984 (see page 13). Later in the decade it gave permission to Mozambican church leaders to establish exploratory contacts with Renamo. In early 1990, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), the country's ruling single party, initiated a process of political liberalization. In July of that year, in direct talks, the two sides agreed, for the first time, to recognize each other as "compatriots and members of the great Mozambican family."

Those talks, and most of the subsequent rounds of negotiations, were held in Rome, with officials of the Italian government, the Church and the Community of San Egidio (a Catholic lay charity) acting as mediators. The first substantive agreement came on 1 December 1990, limiting the deployment of Zimbabwean troops supporting government forces to the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors, in exchange for Renamo's pledge not to attack those routes. This cease-fire soon broke down, and several new rounds of talks ended in deadlock.

Between October 1991 and March 1992, the government and Renamo negotiators reached agreement on a number of specific political reforms, some which had already been enacted in broad outline by the Mozambican legislature, but were opened to further proposals by Renamo. These included the procedures for forming and registering political parties; recognition of freedom of the press, assembly, political activity and movement throughout the country; and the general outlines of the future electoral process.

Reflecting the severity of the 1992 drought, which threatened to plunge the country into one of its worst famines ever, the two sides agreed on a series of "guiding principles for humanitarian assistance" in July of that year. These principles pledged security for international relief personnel and operations and called for relief aid to be distributed freely to all Mozambicans, without political discrimination and in all parts of the country. They also asked the UN to chair a committee, comprised of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the mediators and observers at the Rome talks, to coordinate and supervise all humanitarian assistance operations in the country. Three months later the general peace agreement, containing seven separate protocols as well as other clauses, was signed.

troops), Nampula (Bangladesh) and Tete (Botswana) transport corridors, which, like the Beira route, provide road, rail and/or oil pipeline links from Mozambique's ports on the Indian Ocean to the neighbouring countries to the north and west (see map). Uruguayan troops will guard the National Highway, the main north-south transport artery inside Mozambique. The units will also provide additional patrols and observation outside the corridors and will verify unauthorized cross-border flows of arms and of military personnel.



Demobilization a key priority

Keen to make a resumption of war more difficult, the Mozambican peace accords stressed as a foremost priority the demobilization of the vast bulk of the combatants and the establishment of a new, unified defence force. However, like other aspects of the peace process, the projected assembly and demobilization of more than 100,000 government and Renamo troops got off to a slow start.

According to the peace agreement, the UN-supervised concentration of combatants into 49 assembly points (29 for Frelimo and 20 for Renamo) should have begun in late October and the actual demobilization process in November. But the location of the first 12 assembly points, seven for government forces and five for Renamo, was not agreed until late February.

There were several reasons for the delays. Neither party has yet provided ONUMOZ with a complete list of troop strengths, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives which according to the peace accords should have been supplied by 15 October. Renamo has also been slow in presenting its list of proposed sites. In addition, because of the legacy of distrust, each side wanted the assembly points for its troops located in areas securely under its general control. But sites that were militarily secure were not necessarily logistically suitable.

Another major cause of delay has been Renamo's insistence that the assembly and demobilization of its troops can only commence once 65 per cent of ONUMOZ forces have been deployed. This reflected concern that government forces might take military advantage in the absence of UN forces, but this demand, which goes beyond the provisions in the October accords, has seriously affected progress, the Secretary-General said in his April report.

The lack of a 'status of forces agreement' has also been "a major problem," slowing down the deployment of ONUMOZ forces, over and above those resulting from UN administrative delays and those in troop-contributing countries, the April report said. Prior to the signing of such an agreement with the Mozambican government, movements of UN military personnel required the prior approval of the authorities: "this requirement imposes restrictions on the effectiveness of the mission," the report warned.

"It is in the interest of the Mozambicans themselves

Overseeing the peace accords

To implement the specific agreements entered into by the Mozambican government and Renamo, the 4 October 1992 general peace accords established four main commissions. Government and Renamo representatives are included in each, and the first three are chaired by the UN. The status reports reflect the situation as of 1 April:

Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC): Has overall responsibility for guaranteeing the implementation of the peace agreement, for settling any disputes that arise and for coordinating the activities of the three other commissions. France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the UK, the US and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) are represented on it.

Status: Has held frequent meetings, but disputes over assembly areas and demobilization procedures have prevented it implementing these vital parts of the accords.

Cease-fire Commission (CCF): Subordinate body of CSC with immediate responsibility for supervising the cease-fire and the demobilization process. It includes representatives from Botswana, Egypt, France, Italy, Kenya, Nigeria, Portugal, the UK, US and Zimbabwe.

Status: Has met regularly and maintained a dialogue between parties on the areas within its mandate, which includes de-mining where it has been particularly active. Its regional cease-fire commissions and assembly area monitoring groups, however, had not been established or were not fully operational as of 1 April.

Re-integration Commission (CORE): responsible for the economic and social reintegration of demobilized military personnel into civilian life. It includes representatives of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US and the European Community.

Status: Held one working session, although there has been substantial progress in the logistical arrangements provided by UNOHAC.

Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM): Will oversee the training and organization of the new national defence force, which is to be composed equally of some 15,000 combatants from both the government and Renamo sides. The UN was not asked to take part in this commission, which includes representatives from France, Portugal and the UK.

Status: Parties had not identified their delegations and training has not yet commenced. External members met in Lisbon and agreed a unified contribution to the creation of a defence force.

National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) and National Information Commission (COMINFO): responsible for the national police force, the development of an impartial information system and for hearing human rights complaints.

Status: Renamo had not named representatives .

National Elections Commission and National Commission for Territorial Administration: responsible for overseeing the electoral process and for administration issues in both government and Renamo-held areas.

Status: No meetings.

to see that ONUMOZ is an effective mechanism of verification and confidence-building," Mr. Kofi Annan told *Africa Recovery*, explaining that the UN was not asking for any privileges greater than those which are granted to it by other countries in similar circumstances.

The number of troops expected to be demobilized was initially placed at 107,000, although the actual numbers may be somewhat less, depending on how widespread has been the phenomenon of "self-demobilization" — desertion. The process will unfold in two phases: the actual demobilization of troops, then their reintegration into civil life.

The first stage will include the encampment of the forces in the 49 assembly points (a process which itself is now to be phased), registration of soldiers, and collection of arms. The weapons, held under UN guard, will later be destroyed. Once registered, the former soldiers will be given severance pay (equivalent to six months' salary) and transported to their home areas. The costs of this phase are expected to reach nearly $50 mn, plus another $10 mn borne by ONUMOZ for operating the assembly areas. This does not include back-pay for government troops, some of whom have not been paid for months. The government has had difficulty finding the resources for this, but the mutiny of some troops in March over the lack of pay also demonstrated its importance to the peace process.

WFP will supply basic food rations to all assembled troops, while UNICEF will help provide wells, boreholes, pumps and engines, as well as simple non-food items such as soap, blankets and cooking pots. The situation in the Renamo assembly areas, where there are few available social services, is expected to be particularly difficult and UNOHAC is urging NGOs to also help with health care, water and sanitation. In addition, WHO has prepared a $1.2 mn programme to provide medical screening and treatment for all demobilized soldiers and their dependents. UNESCO, besides aiding the educational reintegration of children from displaced and refugee families, is developing programmes to help former child soldiers, who were especially common in the Renamo ranks. "Many of these children suffer from serious psychological traumas characterized by permanent fear, feelings of rebellion and revolt, and to whom special socio-psychological and educational attendance and care must be provided," a UNESCO mission report states.

Once demobilized, troops and their families will be transported back to their home areas, following arrangements made by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Mozambican Ministry of Transport and Communication. The second phase of the demobilization process will be just as essential as the first for the long-term stability of the country: effectively reintegrating the former troops into regular social and economic life. Many have spent most of their active lives in the military and may lack the skills and resources to earn a living by other means. "If you leave those people

without jobs," says Mr. Ajello, "there will be an enormous increase in criminality, and the entire process could be jeopardized."

The Rome donors conference heard an appeal for $23.5 mn to provide technical and professional training, scholarships, start-up kits for agriculture and small-scale enterprises and other assistance programmes for former troops, including those who have been disabled. IOM is helping to set up a computerized database to track each demobilized soldier, from registration in the assembly camps to reintegration into civilian life.

Of those troops who are not demobilized, some 15,000 each from the government and Renamo are to be reorganized and retrained into a new unified military (an army of 24,000, an air force of 4,000 and a navy of 2,000). France, Portugal and the UK have been asked to provide assistance, especially in retraining the new force. British and Zimbabwean officers have for several years operated a training programme for Mozambican troops in Nyanga, in eastern Zimbabwe, and Renamo officials have expressed interest in taking part.

Following a meeting in Lisbon, the three countries have agreed contributions to the creation of the new defence force. However, despite warnings from Mr. Ajello that delays could affect the peace process, the overseeing commission for the formation of the defence force, CCFADM, had not held any formal meetings by early April.

The failure of Renamo to identify representatives to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) has had a negative effect in this area. The importance of this commission was demonstrated by Renamo's strong protest in March that government military personnel were already being integrated into the existing police force. Human rights' violations, which should be handled by this Commission and the National Information Commission (COMINFO), also "go unheeded," the Secretary-General's April report points out.

Preparing for elections

Because of the delays in deploying the ONUMOZ forces and starting demobilization, there is a general consensus that it will be necessary to postpone the national elections, which according to the original peace agreement had been tentatively set for October 1993. No new target date has yet been put forward, but it is widely understood that the elections are not likely to be held until sometime in 1994.

Narla Ussene

War damage in Maputo Province. Mozambique's insurgency brought devastation to most of the country's public and social infrastructure.

Several of the specific protocols negotiated as part of the overall peace agreement outline the nature of the new political system and procedures for democratic elections. These agreements build on the process of political liberalization that the government had already embarked on in 1990, when it promulgated a new constitution that abolished Frente de Libertação de Moçambique's (Frelimo's) institutional monopoly on political power, declared a multiparty system, provided for periodic elections for the presidency and national assembly and guaranteed a range of rights and freedoms. In response, more than a score of opposition political parties have emerged.

Unless demobilized combatants have the means to earn a living the entire peace process could be jeopardized.

As an encouragement to Renamo to halt its insurgency, one of the negotiated protocols commits the Mozambican government to providing the organization with assistance in transforming itself into a regu-

Chronology

September 1964 — Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) launches armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule.

September 1974 — Following coup in Lisbon, Portugal agrees to unconditional handover of power to Frelimo transitional government.

25 June 1975 — Independence officially achieved.

March 1976 — Mozambique closes its borders with Rhodesia in support of Zimbabwean nationalist struggle.

1977 — The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) formed, with Rhodesian support.

March 1980 — South Africa takes over as Renamo's main external backer, a month before Rhodesia becomes independent Zimbabwe.

November 1980 — First annual meeting of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) held in Maputo.

1982 — Renamo pushes war through much of Mozambique. In November Zimbabwe sends troops to protect Beira Corridor. Severe drought begins in central provinces.

January 1983 — Government issues first appeal for food aid as famine worsens.

March 1984 — President Samora Machel signs Nkomati accords with South Africa, in which latter pledges to halt aid to Renamo. War continues to escalate.

September 1984 — Mozambique joins International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

October 1986 — President Machel killed in plane crash, Joaquim Chissano succeeds him.

July 1987 — Economic Rehabilitation Programme supported at World Bank-organized donors conference in Paris.

July 1989 — Frelimo party congress officially abandons Marxism-Leninism.

July 1990 — First direct talks between the government and Renamo.

November 1990 — New constitution adopted transforming Mozambique into multiparty state, with periodic elections, and guaranteeing democratic rights.

December 1990 — Agreement on restricting Zimbabwean troops to Beira and Limpopo Corridors, but a cease-fire soon breaks down.

1992 — Mozambique, like rest of Southern Africa, plunged into worst drought since early this century.

July 1992 — Government and Renamo agree on "guiding principles for humanitarian assistance" pledging security for relief operations.

4 October 1992 — General peace agreement signed in Rome between President Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama.

15 October 1992 — Cease-fire formally goes into effect. Mr. Aldo Ajello, appointed several days earlier as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique, arrives in Maputo.

15-16 December 1992 — At Rome conference donors pledge $398 million for humanitarian and electoral assistance.

16 December 1992 — UN Security Council approves Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal for creation of UN Operation for Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

14 February 1993 — ONUMOZ Force Commander Major-General Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva assumes his duties in Maputo.

1 April 1993 — First peace-keeping contingent of Italian troops fully operational in the Beira Corridor.

lar political party. This is to include office space and transport and communications facilities in Maputo and all the provincial capitals. Since the government is itself short of funds, it was agreed that it would seek outside assistance for this purpose

Mr. Ajello has been meeting with donor countries, highlighting the importance of Renamo's transformation into a political party if peace is to be secured. Noting that the international support pledged at the various donor conferences exceeds $1 bn, he said that "you risk making this investment useless if you don't spend a few million dollars to provide Renamo the resources necessary to build up the party. If they feel they cannot compete [in the elections] because they don't have the minimum resources, they would prefer to go back into the bush and fight." Italy is expected to provide assistance to Renamo. As a registered party, Renamo, like Frelimo and other political parties, would also be eligible to receive subsidies and logistical support for the election campaign. "Adequate legal advice, logistical planning and support would be as important as political commitment of the two parties to ensure free and fair elections," Mr. Boutros-Ghali said.

Electoral law

On 26 March the government distributed a draft Electoral Law to Renamo and other political parties. The government has called a multi-party conference to debate and hopefully agree the draft which will then be sent to the National Assembly for approval. Only when the Law has been agreed will the National Elections Commission envisaged in the general peace agreement be established

As in other aspects of the peace process, the accords foresee a major support and supervisory role for the UN in helping to prepare the presidential and legislative elections. UNDP, along with the European Community, has already played an important role in coordinating and providing technical assistance for the electoral process

The ONUMOZ Electoral Division will verify the impartiality of the Elections Commission; verify that political parties have freedom of organization, movement, assembly, expression and access to the media; and see that voter registration is conducted properly. There will be one polling station for approximately every 800 voters, and each party and presidential candidate will be allowed observers at each station, to observe both the election process and counting. In addition, up to 1,200 international observers will be mobilized by the UN, from its own personnel and from various regional organizations, governments and NGOs.

II. OVERCOMING HUNGER, DISEASE AND THE LEGACY OF WAR

Although hunger remains widespread and many of Mozambicans will continue to depend on food aid for some time to come, the immediate threat of massive famine has receded.

A month after the signing of the peace accords, the most severe drought this century — which had devastated food production across Southern Africa — finally broke. Rains began to fall throughout Mozambique, except in some southern and central provinces. Many farmers were able to grow crops of maize, cassava, beans and even some rice. In a report on the situation in Sofala, the Maputo weekly *Domingo* wrote: "With the rains, the whole countryside is bustling with peasant activity. From dawn to dusk, on every side, along the trails, you see people working, sowing seed. The only sign of the recent war is the fact that these people are undernourished."

Initial projections indicate a harvest in April almost twice that of last year — except in Gaza where poor crops are expected — although still below normal levels. This is because not enough seeds, hand tools and draught oxen reached farmers in time, and because large sections of the agricultural labour force were still displaced. Nevertheless, surpluses are expected in several provinces and mechanisms to market this are now being investigated. UN relief officials believe that if adequate seeds, tools and health care can be provided over the next year, and the rains continue to fall at normal levels, there should be a big improvement in the overall situation by 1994. In its latest preliminary figures, WFP tentatively estimates that the number of people requiring direct food aid in 1993-94 could fall to under 1 million from 3.5 million in 1992-93. This, however, does not include refugees.

Under the peace accords, the central role in coordinating the different facets of international relief work in Mozambique falls to UNOHAC. This is a highly complex undertaking, given the enormity of Mozambique's needs, the frequent population movements within the country and across borders, the extensive areas that need to be covered with a still poor system of transport and communications, and the large number of different aid donors and relief organizations involved, ranging from government and UN agencies to a multiplicity of NGOs.

Headed by Bernt Bernander, UNOHAC has officers specifically assigned to food aid, health care, water and sanitation, population movements, food security and production, non-food humanitarian aid, logistics and NGO operations. Its field activities are coordinated out of provincial offices in Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambézia, as well as from two regional offices governing the northern and southern provinces.

A. Holiman/UNHCR

Refugees from Mozambique's civil war collect water at UNHCR's Mankhokwe camp in Malawi. More than 1 million Mozambicans lived in such camps in Malawi through much of the 1980s.

The cease-fire has made it possible to extend UNOHAC operations to formerly inaccessible war zones. WFP food aid distribution in March was a record 19,000 tonnes. UNOHAC reports that between the signing of the accords and the end of March some 14,000 tonnes of food and seeds, as well as agricultural tools and other relief items were delivered to Renamo-controlled areas in Sofala, Manica, Zambézia, Nampula, Maputo and Gaza provinces, despite the poor condition of roads and bridges, lack of suitable trucks and delays caused by the rains making some roads impassable.

Such an extension of food deliveries is a vital component of the peace process, asserts Mr. Mark Latham, WFP's Director of Operations in Mozambique. "It is absolutely essential that food reaches all those in need if we want to ensure a smooth transition to democracy, free and fair elections and the reconstruction of a country ranked as the poorest in the world," he says.

Relief still vital

Alongside such signs of progress, many problems remain. Over half of all urban and rural households suffer from food insecurity. With domestic food production still at very low levels and markets not yet recovered from the disruptions of war, a large proportion of the population is still dependent on direct food aid. Distribution systems have been unable to reach all of them.

WFP in its latest preliminary estimates cautiously believes the number of people requiring direct food aid in 1993-94 could fall to under 1 million from 3.5 million in 1992-93, excluding refugees.

In parts of the country, relief workers have come under fire and food trucks have been hijacked. Attacks have come from bandit groups taking advantage of the disorder in the country, from deserters from Renamo and the government army, and from unpaid and hungry troops acting outside government control. In Zambézia's Nicoadala district, for example, army veterans, complaining that they were not receiving food aid, looted a convoy of trucks transporting maize for the UK-based NGO Save the Children. Elsewhere in the same province, food convoys have been stopped by Renamo forces, armed groups belonging to Unamo (a split-off from Renamo) and former *naparamas* (members of a rural militia that once fought against Renamo but which has since splintered into various bands).

Weakened by prolonged malnutrition and scarcities of food and health care, many Mozambicans continue to die. Overall estimates are unavailable, but fragmentary accounts suggest that death rates may still be high among displaced people — the *deslocados* — and in areas that have received little or no outside assistance. The administrator of Marromeu district in Sofala province reported in early February that dozens of people were dying there because of a lack of food aid. Catholic officials say that in the church-run centres for displaced people, an average of between 20 and 30 people die each day.

A "consolidated humanitarian assistance programme" under preparation by UNOHAC, to cover the period from May 1993 to April 1994, tentatively estimates that Mozambique will still need $700 mn in external assistance to cover a range of relief and rehabilitation needs. Of that amount, more than $200 mn may be needed to cover emergency relief assistance.

Targeted food aid requirements for Mozambique — excluding refugees — during 1993-94 could be well down on 1992-93 levels, preliminary estimates from WFP suggest. During 1992-93, direct food aid requirements for some 3.5 million displaced and drought-affected people and for demobilized soldiers and their families totalled some 497,881 tonnes, according to WFP figures. Donors pledged some 90 per cent of this, and despite limited and congested port capacity and extremely difficult conditions in Mozambique the vast bulk of food aid needs have been delivered and distributed.

Thanks to the rains and the return of peace, a WFP assessment mission carried out in March suggests that the number of people, excluding refugees, requiring direct food aid in 1993-94 could fall to under 1 million, with no drought-affected people. The figures are still very tentative and sensitive to radical reappraisal if production is again badly affected through renewed violence or the failure of the October-March rains. But they suggest a sharp reduction in emergency food aid needs and, given the present level of carry-over stock and deliveries in the pipeline, WFP officials believe there may not be a need for any further pledges. WFP points out, however, that there have been no donor pledges to a 60,000 tonnes reserve stock, which is an essential component of food security.

Mozambican refugees, for whom emergency food aid was running at some 250,000 tonnes in 1992-93 will continue to need aid. The rate of returnee inflow could also complicate the overall food aid picture, though many are or could become quickly self-sufficient, UN officials estimate.

Mozambique will also continue to need a large amount of programme food aid, which is distributed through markets, food-for-work programmes and other schemes. Requirements for this element totalled 816,000 tonnes in 1992-93, of which pledges were received for a little over 500,000 tonnes. No amounts have yet been decided for 1993-94 levels, but earlier WFP estimates had suggested that some 800,00 tonnes would still be required.

Other urgent emergency requirements are for medical assistance, given the destruction of much of Mozambique's health-care system over the years and the recent epidemics of cholera and measles. These have become especially serious in the *deslocado* centres within Mozambique and the refugee camps in Malawi, as well as in some of the more isolated Renamo areas. Unfortunately, despite donor generosity in providing food in response to past relief aid appeals,

emergency health needs were often underpledged. Out of the $770,000 requested for health in Mozambique in a June 1992 UN-SADC appeal, only $121,000 in pledges had been made by December.

Despite resource constraints, UN agencies and NGOs in particular have been stepping up their health-related activities. This has often been easier in the more accessible camps, where the ICRC, Mozambican Red Cross, UNICEF, Médecins sans frontières and other groups have been providing medicines, child vaccinations and nutritional supplements to *deslocados* and refugees. ICRC officials note that it has been more difficult in the Renamo areas, where in addition to problems of access to the regions themselves, the population tends to be more scattered. Nevertheless, the ICRC, supported by UNICEF, is sending medical teams into some of the most critical districts, and as the security situation improves other organizations are following.

Since December, UNICEF has stepped up its health-related operations in the Ile and Namacurra districts of Zambézia province, to cite just one example. Mobile vaccination teams will travel through the districts to immunize children against the main killer diseases and materials are being provided for the reconstruction of health facilities. Communities themselves are being mobilized to improve sanitation conditions and dig new wells.

WHO estimates that nearly $19 mn in donor support will be needed to carry out its programmes for strengthening local health facilities in areas of resettlement, which will help some 5 million people.

Removing landmines

Because of the importance of secure road travel for improving the effectiveness of humanitarian operations, the task of supervising the removal of landmines falls under UNOHAC's responsibility. UN estimates place the number of landmines littering Mozambique as high as 2 million, laid by both the government forces and Renamo, as well as some left from the days of Portugal's counter-insurgency campaigns in the 1960s and early 1970s. As people start moving around the country more and food convoys try to reach previously inaccessible areas, the problem has become especially acute, with frequent accidents. On the Beira-Inhaminga road, for example, a WFP food convoy hit two anti-personnel mines in February, while in northern Zambézia, a Renamo representative and a worker for the British charity Oxfam were killed by a mine. Truck drivers are refusing to operate in certain mine-filled areas.

Sweden and the Netherlands have pledged some

A country devastated by war

Over the decade of the 1980s, according to varying estimates, as many as 1 million Mozambicans perished, either directly in the war or as a result of war-induced famine and declining health conditions. A 1989 study by the UN Economic Commission for Africa placed the total economic losses to Mozambique caused by the war during 1980-88 at a staggering $15 bn — more than five times the country's actual 1988 gross domestic product (GDP).

This conflagration was a direct consequence of the attempts by Mozambique's powerful, antagonistic neighbours — first Rhodesia and then the apartheid regime of South Africa — to destabilize the newly independent nation. The South African government, however, has recently been closely associated with the peace process — it was instrumental in bringing Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama to Rome at a crucial moment in negotiations — but previous governments in Pretoria saw Mozambique as a threat.

Almost from its birth in 1975, when Mozambique won its independence from Portugal after a decade-long guerrilla struggle led by the Frelimo, the country found itself caught in a punishing regional conflict. Because of Frelimo's opposition to racist rule, it soon joined the international embargo on the Rhodesian white settler regime and gave support and sanctuary to the Zimbabwean nationalist fighters. The Rhodesians responded with bombing raids into Mozambique and helped Mozambican dissidents form Renamo in 1977. By the end of the 1970s, Mozambique had already sustained costs of some $550 mn, from lost transport earnings and direct damage caused by Rhodesian raids.

When the Zimbabwean liberation movements came to power in 1980, South Africa took over as Renamo's main source of external aid. With new financing, armaments and training, Renamo was able to extend its war through wide swathes of the country. Direct South African pressures also mounted, including occasional commando raids into Mozambique and the expulsion of many Mozambican mine workers from South Africa, depriving Mozambique of their wage remittances. For the apartheid authorities in Pretoria, the destabilization of Mozambique (as of Angola and other countries in the region) was designed to disrupt transport and other economic links among the black-ruled states of Southern Africa in order to weaken them and to punish them for supporting the anti-apartheid forces within South Africa.

In an effort to stem Renamo's destruction, Mozambique took an unprecedented step — and surprised its neighbours — by negotiating an agreement with South Africa in 1984. In this "Nkomati accord," each side pledged to halt material aid to the other's domestic opponents. But outside aid, including from South Africa, continued to reach Renamo and the war spread through even more of the country.

By 1987-88, nearly half of all primary schools and a third of the rural health network had been destroyed or forced to close down, with the war damage especially heavy in the provinces of Zambézia, Tete and Sofala. UNICEF, in its special 1987 report *Children on the Frontline*, estimated that a quarter of a million Mozambican children died of war-related causes over the first half of the 1980s, and the numbers climbed still further over the second half. In 1988 a report by Mr. Robert Gersony commissioned by the U.S. State Department attributed many of the worst atrocities to Renamo and termed the war "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II."

Mozambique's entire economy went into a nose-dive. Between 1980 and 1986, the real GDP fell by 21 per cent and commodity exports plummeted by 72 per cent. By 1989 cultivated land area had fallen to less than half its extent in 1983 and cattle herds had been decimated. By the end of the decade Mozambique was importing 85 per cent of its food requirements.

Mozambican refugees*	
Host country	*Number*
Malawi	1,100,000
South Africa	500,000
Zimbabwe	140,000
Tanzania	88,000
Swaziland	40,000
Zambia	25,000
Total	**1,893,000**

Expected destination of returnees*	
Province	*Number*
Tete	632,000
Zambézia	244,000
Manica	228,000
Sofala	110,000
Gaza	100,000

* Tentative estimates. Returnees cover only 1.3 million refugees registered with UNHCR. Majority of unregistered refugees in South Africa and Swaziland expected to return to Gaza and Maputo provinces.

$7 mn to the DHA-managed trust fund for humanitarian operations in Mozambique specifically for de-mining. A national de-mining plan has been drawn up with UN assistance. Preparations for UN-supervised de-mining operations are under way. The British transnational Lonrho has also been contracted by the ICRC to clear seven routes designated by the relief agency as priorities for its humanitarian operations. But the process of detecting and removing the mines is a delicate and laborious process which is expected to take months and even years. The UN's de-mining efforts will include both larger-scale operations contracted out to professional firms and programmes to train up to 400 Mozambicans a year to carry out smaller-scale de-mining activities.

Refugees return home

Just one day after the cease-fire formally came into effect, large numbers of Mozambican refugees in Malawi appeared at the Zobwe border post to cross back into Tete province. In the weeks and months that followed, thousands, then tens of thousands streamed across the border at Zobwe and numerous other posts, seeking to return to their homes and to rebuild their lives.

"The repatriation of Mozambican refugees will be the biggest operation ever undertaken by UNHCR in Africa." — *Ms. Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees*

Estimates of the number of spontaneous returnees, as of early April, range between 180,000-290,000. To the normal difficulties of assessing such flows, has been added the habit of many refugees, particularly in Malawi, with homes close to the border to move back and forth. The flow might have been even larger if not for the fact that the rainy season made travel difficult and some Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries (Tanzania, Zambia and Swaziland) had gained access to land and were waiting to harvest their crops. There is evidence suggesting that the rate of returnees slowed sharply in March, and UNHCR reported refugees still coming into its camps in Malawi at the rate of 1,000-1,500 a month. After the harvests and with the onset of the dry season, however, many more refugees are expected to return home, provided the security situation remains stable.

At the start of 1993, there were up to 1.9 million Mozambican refugees located in six neighbouring countries, about 1.3 million officially registered with the UNHCR (see table). UNHCR and WFP started a detailed assessment of the requirements for repatriation of refugees in mid-April, with the actual physical return of refugees expected to commence in June. The initial focus will be on refugees in Malawi and Zimbabwe, followed a few months later by Swaziland and in 1994, Tanzania and Zambia. A UNHCR mission to South Africa is planned to determine a possible timetable for the return of those refugees. The entire repatriation operation may take up to three years to complete. The programme is strictly voluntary, and any refugees wishing to remain in their host countries will be offered continued assistance, UNHCR says. In April, UNHCR launched an appeal to donors to fund the operation. The transport and reintegration costs for some 500,000 beneficiaries are expected to reach $30 mn in 1993 alone, and total costs could be close to $200 mn. "This repatriation operation will be the biggest ever undertaken by UNHCR in Africa," said Ms. Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner.

Facilities overwhelmed

Already, the numbers of refugees who have returned on their own are overwhelming the extremely limited support services the Mozambican authorities have been able to set up at short notice. At some refugee support centres, returnees have had to camp out in the open while building their new homes and children, already weakened by malnutrition, have died of diarrhoea. The greatest need for support will be in the central provinces, of Manica, Tete and Zambézia which could account for over 80 per cent of returnees.

Like the hundreds of thousands of *deslocados* within the country who will also be trying to get back to their villages and homes, almost all of these refugees will urgently need a range of support and services. UNHCR, in collaboration with other UN and non-UN organizations, is planning to provide vaccination and health screening before their return and supply building materials, temporary food rations and agricultural input packages in their home areas. The refugee reintegration programme will also include the rehabilitation of 140 health posts and the upgrading of 1,000 shallow wells and boreholes. UNHCR has also held discussions with the Mozambican government to ensure that the returning refugees have access to land.

III. THE CHALLENGES OF RECONSTRUCTION

Although Mozambique's pressing emergency needs are still large, it is vital to simultaneously begin the "rehabilitation phase," argues Mr. Bernander, the UNOHAC Director. The Mozambican government is keen to get beyond an emergency situation that has already lasted for a decade, and at the same time "donors want to feel that they are contributing more constructively toward something that links up with reconstruction and development." This is particularly vital if the difficult economic reform programme the government has undertaken since 1987 is to be kept on track and its potential benefits fully realized.

Accordingly, the 1993-94 humanitarian assistance programme being prepared by UNOHAC will seek to channel about half the resources that it raises to the restoration of basic services in rural areas, agricultural production, water, sanitation, and rural infrastructure, etc.

With the need to resettle at least one-quarter of the population and to rebuild about half the country's infrastructure, Mozambique faces a truly enormous and complex challenge of reconstruction. Not only do factories, power plants, roads, schools, medical clinics and many other economic and social facilities have to be restored, but the economy as a whole still confronts an uncertain and complicated process of shifting away from the legacy of an overwhelmingly state-directed war economy to one more open to market forces.

Whatever the difficulties in carrying through such a process, Mozambique nevertheless has the advantage of significant economic potential: fertile land, extensive forests, known mineral deposits, plentiful off-shore fishing areas, considerable hydro-electric capacity and a large labour force.

Though the long era of Portuguese colonial rule had left most of this potential untapped, the early years of independence brought some hopeful prospects for the country's development. There was a broad range of export crops — cashew nuts, sugar cane, cotton, tea and sisal — and agricultural production increased by nearly 9 per cent between 1977 and 1981. In 1975 the Moatize coal mine was producing nearly 600,000 tonnes, out of Mozambique's confirmed coal reserves of some 6 bn tonnes. Iron ore and gold were also produced, and there were deposits of bauxite, manganese, platinum, diamonds, natural gas and uranium. The Cabora Bassa hydro-electric dam, begun in colonial times, had an enormous generating capacity, enough to cover Mozambique's own needs and to sell large amounts to South Africa and other neighbouring countries.

Mozambique was also able to register some impressive social achievements. By 1982, school enrolments had doubled since independence, adult education programmes had reduced illiteracy and mass child vaccination campaigns and the establishment of an extensive network of rural health clinics improved health conditions and life expectancy to the point where WHO declared it one of the best in Africa.

Stephane Hollyman/Gamma Liaison

Digging for water in the dry bed of the Limpopo River. Drought devastated much of Mozambique during 1992.

Beyond the massive human suffering it inflicted, one of the greatest tragedies of the war was the reversal of many of these economic and social gains (see graphs, page 20).

Now the poorest country in the world in terms of per capita GDP, and emerging from a decade-and-a-half

Ernst Schade/Impact Visuals

Transporting maize to drought-stricken Zimbabwe through Mozambique's vital Beira Corridor. Peace will bring dividends for the whole Southern Africa region.

of war, Mozambique itself has few of the financial resources needed to take on the challenge of reconstruction. External assistance has become dominant — in 1990, for example, it was equivalent to nearly 78 per cent of GDP and was four times government revenues.

Foreign aid will remain an essential element for years to come. "The state has no capacity to undertake any investment at all, except with recourse to foreign aid," said Finance Minister Eneas Comiche in presenting the government's 1993 budget in December. In 1993 alone, more than $600 mn will be needed to support Mozambique's Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP), not counting emergency relief needs.

On top of this is the desperate need for debt relief. At $4.7 bn in 1991, Mozambique's debt is more than four times the country's GDP, the highest ratio in Africa. Scheduled debt servicing obligations in 1992 of over $500 mn, if actually paid, would have been equivalent to 133 per cent of export earnings.

Estimates at the December donors' conference in Paris anticipated that Mozambique would require at least $420 mn of its debt payments rescheduled if it was to have a chance of realizing the basic objectives of the ESRP. In March, the Paris Club of official Western creditors granted Mozambique relief on 'enhanced Toronto' terms — an effective 50 per cent cancellation of debt servicing due — which will mean considerable savings for 1993 and 1994.

In addition to external support, the end of war should ease certain domestic financial pressures, making it possible, for example, to redirect significant budgetary resources away from military and security purposes — which now account for 38 per cent of current government expenditure — and towards economic and

Mozambique's regional role

Peace and economic recovery in Mozambique will have profound implications for the entire Southern Africa region. With its long coastline and established ports, Mozambique is a natural conduit to overseas markets for the landlocked economies of Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and even Botswana. It has long been regarded as a key element in plans to develop the region's large economic potential — hence South Africa's concentration on Mozambique in its destabilization efforts during the 1980s (see box, page 13).

Mozambique's pivotal role in regional transport links was highlighted when the then Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), at its founding in 1980, located its all-important Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) in Maputo. Transport and communications projects were key to SADCC's goal of reducing its members' economic dependence on South Africa and in fostering their own integration. SATCC was responsible for coordinating the funding search and implementation for those projects.

By 1990, some $2 bn of the $2.5 bn raised for SADCC projects had gone towards the transport and communications sector. Much of this centred on Mozambique, with projects to rehabilitate the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala rail lines, similar plans to upgrade major roads, including the important route for Malawi and Zambia via Tete, and improvements to the ports of Maputo, Beira and Nacala.

This aimed to reduce neighbouring states' dependence on longer and more costly routes, either to Dar es Salaam (Zambian copper in particular), or to the ports of South Africa. Blantyre, for example, is only 840 miles from the port of Nacala by rail, against 3,342 miles for Durban. Harare is 698 miles from Beira and Bulawayo 1,061 from Maputo compared to

social rehabilitation needs. Reducing the size of Mozambique's armed forces could bring estimated savings on military salaries alone of between $30 mn and $50 mn annually.

Reform amidst war

Although the war itself was clearly the most important factor in Mozambique's economic decline, the government acknowledgde by the mid-1980s that ineffective and inappropriate economic policies had also played a role. These were particularly marked in agriculture, where output declined not only because of war and drought, but also because of inadequate support for small-scale farming and a forceful programme of relocating scattered households into communal villages.

In an initial step toward economic reform, the government drew up an Economic Action Programme for 1984-86 aimed at stimulating agricultural and industrial production as well as improving the management of public finances, monetary and credit policies, employment, wages and prices. It also drafted a new investment code designed to provide greater incentives to potential external investors. In 1984, Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank and that same year, on the basis of its new economic programme, succeeded in obtaining a substantial debt rescheduling agreement from the Paris Club. These initial measures, combined with the end of the 1982-84 drought, managed to check the economic decline, but otherwise brought few discernible improvements.

In 1987, Mozambique moved toward a more ambitious and fuller-scale structural adjustment strategy, known as the Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE, by its Portuguese initials). With significant financial support from the World Bank and other external donors — and despite the on-going devastation caused by the war — the PRE succeeded in reviving economic growth, which averaged a robust 5 per cent a year over 1987-89. This reflected a substantial increase in agricultural production in the family and private commercial sectors as a result of improved price incentives and the increased flow of consumer goods, as well as a recovery in light manufacturing resulting from increased imports of spare parts, equipment and other inputs. Per capita consumption levels rose thanks to generally higher aid flows.

Over 1990-91, however, growth rates again slowed, to less than 2 per cent a year, due to the worsening war situation, poor rains and a lag in foreign aid disbursements. The cut-off in the late 1980s of Soviet bloc assistance, which had averaged well over $100 mn a year, was not immediately compensated from other sources.

The PRE marked a significant shift away from state-directed economic strategies and introduced a range of market mechanisms. Prices were gradually liberalized and

Rail links in Southern Africa

2,077 and 1,859 miles respectively from Durban.

Much of South Africa's regional destabilization effort in the 1980s focused on disrupting these transport links, virtually closing down work on the Limpopo and Nacala links. The Beira corridor (which also carries Zimbabwe's oil pipeline) was only kept open by the costly deployment of Zimbabwean troops.

Mozambique's giant Cabora Bassa Dam, built with the idea of supplying power to South Africa, also has the potential to supply other countries in the region. But plans in the mid-1980s to forge a link with energy-deficient Zimbabwe came to nothing in the face of constant Renamo disruption of power lines. As a result, Zimbabwe has opted for a more expensive development of a new power source on the Zambezi. With the return to a more secure environment, however, Cabora Bassa's potential could become quickly realized regionally, feeding power into not only Zimbabwe, but also Botswana and Zambia, the grids of which inter-connect, and into South Africa.

The benefits peace can bring to the region have already been demonstrated, Mozambican ports played a vital role in the rapid and successful distribution of emergency food supplies to Southern Africa during the 1992 drought, handling 30 per cent of the region's emergency imports. Beira, where port facilities have been expanded and the harbour deepened, was the single most important port for such imports, handling, as of end-January, 991,111 tonnes — 19 per cent of the total (just ahead of Durban). In addition, Maputo had handled 792,080 tonnes and Nacala a further 53,230.

the currency, the metical, was repeatedly devalued to bring it closer to the market-determined "parallel" rate. Some 120 small and medium-scale enterprises were privatized between 1987 and 1991. In the latter year a law on privatization was adopted to expand the process, and a list of 40 larger state-owned enterprises was drawn up, of which 10 are expected to be privatized by the end of 1993. Major reforms to liberalize the banking sector are also under way.

Mozambique at a glance: 1991	
Area	802,000 sq. km.
Cultivated area	5%
Wet season	October - March
Capital	Maputo
Total population	16.1 million
Pop. growth rate	2.7%
Official language	Portuguese
GNP per capita	$70
Currency	Metical (MZM) MZM 1,434.5 = $1
Gross Domestic Prod.	MZM 1.9 bn
of which: agriculture.	65%
Total external debt	$4,700 mn
Debt service ratio	146% (12.2%)*
Life expectancy	47 years
Adult literacy rate	33%
Infant mortality rate	170 per 1,000
Under-5 mortality	297 per 1,000
Access to clean water	24%
Access to health care	39%

* Obligations before rescheduling. Ratio in brackets based on debt service actually paid.

Coming on top of the other social difficulties caused by war, the new economic policies had a serious immediate impact on living standards, especially in the urban centres. Trade liberalization brought a flood of new products to the market, from sewing needles to cars and computers, but very few people could afford them. Real wages plummetted by more than a quarter in the first year of the programme, and eroded further subsequently, provoking a wave of sometimes violent labour protests and strikes. Resources for sectors such as health and education remained extremely tight, although their shares in government expenditure have edged up in the past few years.

The impact of the war, of course, made it that much more difficult to tackle such social problems. And apart from whatever problems there were in the PRE, continued rural dislocation and insecurity hampered agricultural production, which has remained at levels far below that of the early 1980s.

Priorities for recovery

Building from the more immediate tasks of postwar reconstruction, the government's Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme seeks to begin the arduous process of reviving economic activity and setting a course toward the development of the country's extensive economic resources. Because of the traumas suffered by Mozambique's population and the extent of poverty, improvement of the conditions and skills of its people takes a high priority.

The Mozambican government's strategy for poverty alleviation is two-fold. Above all, it aims to generate employment and incomes for the poor through the promotion of family-based agriculture and labour-intensive industries and services. But in addition, it seeks to improve the provision of social services for the poor and establish a "safety net" of direct and indirect income transfers to protect the most vulnerable households.

One particularly vulnerable sector of the population has been women, who comprise not only a majority of the refugees and displaced people but also a high proportion of the poorest in general. A number of NGOs and government institutions have directed specific projects toward helping women cope with the consequences of war and economic decline. UNDP is planning to support organizations working with women in the shantytowns around Maputo, UNICEF has been operating several rural women's projects and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) supports a women's credit scheme in the Chokwe region.

As an annual target, the government aims to increase recurrent expenditures, in real terms, by 4.5 per cent for health, 1.5 per cent for education and 1 per cent for agriculture. Its three-year public investment programme, covering 1992-94, will allocate 42.5 per cent of central government investments for the social sectors (education, health and water) and 30 per cent for agriculture — compared to 15 per cent in the previous investment programme.

In contrast to the agricultural policies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which favoured large state farms, the focus is now on the family sector. This comprises about 3 million households — or about 80 per cent of the total labour force — and covers 97 per cent of the cultivated area.

Since most farming in Mozambique is labour-intensive, the return of refugees and displaced people to their fields should by itself provide an important boost to agricultural production. More significantly, policies and programmes are being put into place to improve producer incentives; promote rural marketing through the liberalization of domestic trade, greater access to credit and rehabilitation of feeder roads; and shift public expenditures towards research and extension activities to raise the productivity of small-scale farmers. The restructuring of commercial state farms will also continue — about 50 have already been sold or leased to private interests — and a Lands Commission has been set up to examine land use and distribution strategies to facilitate commercial ventures (all land is currently state-owned).

The importance of fisheries in Mozambique's total economy has been growing — it was the only

Mozambique: economic indicators

	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
GDP at current market prices (MZM. bn)	78	147	167	428	657	966	1,340	1,909
Real GDP growth (%)	n.a.	-8.8	0.9	4.4	5.5	5.4	1.3	2.7
Merchandise exports ($mn)	281	77	79	97	103	105	126	162
Merchandise imports ($mn)	720	381	488	578	662	727	790	809
Current account balance ($mn)	-367	-301	-409	-389	-281	-375	-341	-281
Gross budget deficit /GDP (%)	9.6	13.9	17.3	21.3	25.3	25.5	29.5	26.9
Inflation rate (%)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	163	50	42	49	35
Total external debt ($mn)	n.a.	2,714	3,329	4,051	4,197	4,498	4,740	4,700
Debt service ratio (%)	n.a.	24.4	43.3	17.6	21.0	25.3	15.5	12.2
Official development assistance per capita ($)	14	22	30	45	57	53	64	65
Fish exports ($mn)	20.6	33.4	45.6	61.9	39.8	38.8	42.2	61.0
Food production per capita (1979-81=100)	100	91	91	86	86	85	85	77
Exchange rate (average meticais per dollar)	32.4	43.2	40.4	290.7	524.6	744.9	929.1	1,434.5
Reserves (months of export cover)	n.a.	1.4	1.4	2.8	3	2.9	2.9	3.4

Source: FAO, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, World Bank n.a.=not available

major productive sector not to have suffered significant decline since the 1970s. It currently accounts for 40 per cent of foreign earnings, and while the government will seek to strengthen its export performance, it will also try to develop the fishing industry's potential as a source of food for the domestic market.

The strategy for rehabilitating the transport sector, besides seeking to boost rural trade through development of the feeder road network, aims to restore the country's extensive international transit facilities, traditionally a major source of foreign earnings. Because of the destruction and deterioration of much of Mozambique's transport and physical infrastructure, large investments will be needed to rebuild the road and rail network. The Limpopo railway corridor was officially reopened by President Chissano in March, part of the SADC-coordinated programme to rehabilitate Mozambique's transport network which has been intermittingly under way since the early 1980s, but estimates by international aid agencies suggest that some $50-60 mn a year may still be needed through the end of the decade.

Industry and mining, which are largely owned or run by the state, continue to contribute more than 18 per cent of GDP, despite the lack of investment in maintenance and spare parts. The government is open to joint ventures and other foreign investment. External investors have already put resources into the mining sector and into rehabilitating hotels and other parts of a once thriving tourist industry. Many, however, are waiting until the country's infrastructure is sufficiently restored and there is greater confidence in Mozambique's long-term political stability.

The extent of reconstruction needs, the more immediate demands of on-going emergency programmes and the sheer complexity of the political process are severely overstretching the country's limited managerial and technical capacity. Few Mozambicans had been able to obtain any professional training under colonial rule. And despite some initial gains in the immediate years after independence, the disruptions of war and the diversion of resources and personnel to defence hampered efforts to overcome the shortage. Only 3,000 Mozambicans are university graduates and fully a third of senior civil servants have just primary education.

The skills gap was filled to some extent by expatriate advisers, but this did little to help develop Mozambique's own capacity and was also vulnerable to shifts in donor funding — as shown by the sudden departure of Eastern European doctors and other technical advisers when Soviet-bloc aid was cut off. With the aim of providing a longer-term solution, UNDP in particular has been focusing for several years on programmes to transfer skills to Mozambicans, to bolster their own technical and management.

Mozambique will require considerable economic assistance for many years. The scale of its debt burden, implies that currently proposed schemes for debt relief will not return it to financial viability unless there is a spectacular growth in export earnings. The present government has shown its commitment to reform in the most trying circumstances. To succeed, Mozambique will need not only resources, but a stable regional economy and a more buoyant, open world economy. But above all, it first needs to establish a peaceful and stable political environment.It is this that ONUMOZ is dedicated to helping deliver.

IV. UN IN MOZAMBIQUE: LONG TRACK RECORD

The complex task ONUMOZ is now undertaking is greatly helped by the UN's long track record in assistance to Mozambique. Although most directly relevant to the huge humanitarian programme of assistance, the channels, contacts and experience built up over many years throughout the country are also playing a vital part in ensuring the success of the other elements in ONUMOZ's multiple responsibilities.

UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF and WFP have had long-standing programmes in Mozambique, helping to develop both its economic and social infrastructure. As famine, disease, displacement and other consequences of the war took an increasing human toll during the 1980s the various UN agencies stepped up their assistance programmes. From just over $21 mn in 1982, UN agencies disbursed $54.4 mn in 1989.

During the 1982-84 drought relief operations, the different UN specialized agencies — UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNDP, FAO and WHO in particular — began coordinating their activities, both with each other and with the appropriate Mozambican ministries and departments, especially the Department for the Prevention of Natural Disasters (DPCCN). Originally set up during the floods and drought of 1980, the DPCCN subsequently developed into one of the largest and most effective national relief agencies anywhere in Africa, involved in climate monitoring, food aid distribution and aid coordination.

In 1987, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed a Special Representative for Emergency Relief Operations to be responsible for coordinating the various UN emergency activities in the country, in close cooperation with the Mozambican government's own efforts. UN assistance was extensive in helping the government prepare its subsequent annual emergency aid appeals and in mobilizing donor contributions. Parallel to this effort, the World Bank, through its donors' consultative group, raised funding for Mozambique's economic reform programme.

With the rapid expansion of donor activity in Mozambique, the challenges of coordination have become especially daunting. According to UNDP, during the 1988-90 period there were no less than 26 UN agencies, six non-UN multilateral agencies, 44 bilateral donors and official agencies from 35 countries, as well as 143 external NGOs from 23 countries active in Mozambique.

Coordinating aid, to avoid needless duplication and to ensure appropriate and efficient utilization of an increasingly scarce resource, is one of the major tasks facing the international community in assisting African recovery. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued in a December speech in Atlanta, Georgia. It is a task which the UN has already begun in Mozambique, one which can help ensure the success of ONUMOZ and which will remain equally vital when the UN's present peace-keeping role is completed but when the international community's development obligations to Mozambique remain.

The costs of war

Important social gains lost through war must be recovered in peace



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